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Research has shown that the Comparable Truth Baseline Technique outperforms the Small Talk 
with respect to the elicitation of cues to deception. However, their impact on observers’ 
accuracy has not been evaluated yet. In this experiment, participants (N = 74) watched ten 
interviews where senders either lied or told the truth about a set of tasks. Half of the interviews 
were conducted with a Comparable Truth Baseline, the other half with a Small Talk Baseline. 
As predicted, results showed that observers in the Comparable Truth Baseline condition 
outperformed the participants in the Small Talk Baseline condition in terms of total accuracy 
rates. The paper sheds light on the impact of the two baseline techniques in distinguishing truth 
tellers from liars and discourages the use of a small talk baseline. It also provides insights for 
future studies. 
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Observers’ performance at evaluating truthfulness when provided with Comparable Truth or 
Small Talk Baselines 
Introduction 
Research has shown that people’s accuracy in assessing truthfulness and deceit is low (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis including almost 25,000 
observers found a 54% accuracy rate, whereby 50% could be achieved by chance. In addition, 
accuracy of deception judgments are unrelated to confidence in one’s own judgements (DePaulo, 
Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997), suggesting that people have no insight into their 
own competence. Additionally, people from whom one should expect a higher accuracy, such as 
police officers, are not more accurate than laypeople (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
 To explain the low accuracy rates, it has been argued that cues to deception are faint and 
unreliable (Vrij, 2008). DePaulo and colleagues (2003), in one of the most comprehensive meta-
analyses on cues to deception, have found that effect sizes for behavioural and verbal differences 
between truth and lie telling are small, with an average effect size of Cohen’s d = .25 for the most 
diagnostic cues (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Consequently, it should not be surprising that observers’ 
accuracy is low, as having weak cues to rely on when making judgments makes the judgment itself 
difficult (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). It is for this reason that academics are now focusing on 
interviewing techniques aiming at enhancing differences between truth and lie telling (Granhag & 
Vrij, 2010; Vrij, 2014; Vrij & Granhag, 2012). The rationale behind this is that if truth tellers and 
liars do not differ much, it is desirable to find a way to make such differences more evident. 
Academics have explored several approaches that indeed augmented differences between truth 
tellers and liars, including the Strategic Use of Evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015) and cognitive 
credibility assessment (Vrij, 2015; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017).  
There is an alternative interviewing strategy often proposed within police forces: The 
baseline technique (Ewens, Vrij, Jang, & Jo, 2014; Vrij, 2016). The underlying idea is that since 
there are interpersonal differences in behaviour, an interviewer should start by obtaining a 




behavioural baseline of the interviewee through observing the responses in chitchat while answering 
trivial questions. Then, while the interview progresses, the interviewer should compare this baseline 
behaviour with interviewees’ responses to target questions (questions related to the topic under 
investigation). If any difference arises, then one may conclude that the interviewee is lying (Frank, 
Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006). 
The use of the baseline technique in this manner is problematic. People’s nonverbal 
behaviour is related to stakes and topic of conversation (Vrij, 2008), and in terms of stakes and 
topic of conversation the baseline response and the target response are not comparable to each 
other. The result is that both liars and truth tellers are likely to change their behaviour when baseline 
and target responses are compared (Caso, Maricchiolo, Bonaiuto, Vrij, & Mann, 2006; Gnisci, Caso 
e Vrij, 2010; Moston & Engelberg, 1993). Ewens, Vrij, Jang and Jo (2014) empirically tested the 
efficacy of this type of baselining, which they labelled “Small Talk”. When interviewing their 
participants, they started by asking an initial small talk baseline question, followed by several target 
questions. It was found that both truth tellers and liars changed their behaviour during the interview. 
Therefore, they concluded that the small talk baseline in not an effective strategy to detect 
deception.  
Ewens and colleagues (2014) also noted that there is a different type of baseline which may 
work better, the comparable truth baseline. They described it as follows: “Comparable means that 
the baseline the investigator uses must be similar in content, context, stakes, and cognitive and 
emotional involvement to investigative questions” (Vrij, 2016, p. 1114). Vrij and Mann (2001) gave 
a real life example of this type of baseline. They compared several behaviours displayed by a 
suspect in a murder case in different phases of the police interrogation. The suspects was 
interrogated about his activities during the day of the murder and provided a detailed answer 
covering the entire day. Police investigated his whereabouts and could only verify his morning 
activities. Eventually, it became known that he had met the victim in the afternoon and killed her 
later. Vrij and Mann (2001) analysed the videotaped interrogation and found that the suspect did 




show a difference in his behaviour when he discussed his activities in the morning (truth) compared 
to the afternoon and evening (lie). Their results therefore gave credit to the potential effectiveness 
of the comparable truth baseline.  
There is to date only one experimental study in which comparable truth and small talk 
baselines were compared (Palena, Caso, Vrij, & Orthey, 2018). In the comparable truth baseline 
condition, the baseline question referred to three tasks that the participants performed. All 
participants had to answer the baseline question truthfully. Then, in the target phase of the 
interview, half of the participants told the truth and the other half lied about three additional, but 
similar, tasks. In the small talk baseline condition, the baseline question referred to personal 
information about the interviewee (e.g.: the last year spent as a student). Again, all participants had 
to answer the baseline question truthfully. The target questions referred to the same three additional 
tasks as for participants in the comparable truth baseline condition. Again, half of the participants 
responded to this target question truthfully, whereas the other half lied. The authors compared the 
baseline and target responses in terms of similarity for both nonverbal and verbal behaviour. Truth 
tellers’ levels of similarity did not differ from those of liars in the small talk baseline condition, but 
the truth tellers’ levels of similarity were higher than those of liars in the comparable truth baseline 
condition, but only for spatial details. This study thus replicated Ewens et al.’s (2014) study that a 
small talk baseline does not work. Second, it showed that nonverbal baselining is problematic, but 
that verbal baselining may be more effective. 
However, verbal baselining is not straightforward either as speech content is affected by the 
topic of conversation (Vrij, 2008). For example, in Ewens’ et al (2014) study, the baseline 
concerned the informed consent form, whereas the target phase concerned the actual/pretended job. 
Consequently, the speech content of the two phases is expected to be different regardless of 
veracity, as the interviewee talks about two different topics.  
 Palena and colleagues (2018) did not test whether the differences in speech content would 
be clear to lay observers. Bond and DePaulo’s meta-analysis (2006) underlined that when observers 




were previously exposed to senders’ truthful baselines, their accuracy improved. However, such 
previous exposure cannot be considered a baseline obtained through strategic questioning. Rather, 
since observers had simply the opportunity to become familiar with the sender, it was possibly the 
result of “baseline familiarity” (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980, 1982). 
Feeley, deTurck and Young (1995) provided their participants with zero, one, two or four truthful 
baseline exposures, and found that there was a positive linear relationship between the amount of 
familiarity with the sender and observers’ accuracy. Results about the positive effects of baseline 
familiarity are important in personal and intimate relationships but baseline familiarity may be 
difficult to achieve during police investigations, as suspects and investigators are often strangers to 
each other and there is often the need to interview the suspect as soon as possible. Hence, it is more 
likely that police officers will try to obtain baselines with specific questioning rather than through 
increased familiarity. 
 Based on the literature presented above and expecting better efficacy of the comparable truth 
over the small talk baseline, we made the following predictions. 
H1: Observers in the comparable truth baseline condition will reach higher overall accuracy rates 
than those in the small talk baseline condition. 
H2: Observers in the comparable truth baseline condition will also reach higher accuracy rates for 
truth (Hypothesis 2a) and lie detection (Hypothesis 2b). 
Material and methods 
Participants 
 Seventy-four participants (56 women and 18 men), between 19 and 51 years of age (M = 
25.67; SD = 6.14), took part in the experiment. One of them was excluded from the analyses as the 
person did not followed the instructions. This left us with a total sample of seventy-three 
participants. Thirty-seven participants were allocated to the comparable truth condition, whereas the 
remaining thirty-six were allocated to the small talk condition. 
Design 




 The experiment was based on a two-group comparison. The type of baseline (Comparable 
Truth vs. Small Talk) was the between-subjects factor. Total, truth and lie accuracy rates, and d-
prime and β values were the dependent variables.  
Stimulus material 
 Twenty video stimuli were used for this experiment. All senders portrayed in the videos 
performed a mission that consisted of a series of tasks. The mission started with the participant 
receiving an envelop from the experimenter, which contained a PC password. Then, the 
experimenter left the room. As soon as the participant logged onto the PC only one file, a word 
document named “Read Me”, appeared on the desktop. Such file informed the participant that s/he 
had now to look for CD-ROM that was placed inside the only backpack available in the room. The 
word document ended informing the participant to watch the video file that was recorded in such 
CD-ROM. This showed a mean telling to the participant to look again into the backpack to search 
for a key. The man also explained that the key served to open a safe-deposit box that was in the 
room. Once the participant opened the box, s/he found additional instruction that asked them to 
send an e-mail to a specific address and to exit the room and wait for a person to come.  This person 
was actually a confederate and the meeting served to split the mission into two subsets. Everything 
that happened before the meeting was the comparable truth baseline section. Everything that 
happened after the meeting was the target section of the interview. The confederate gave a 
newspaper to the participant, and informed him/her that it contained further instruction. Then, the 
confederate left the room. The instruction guided the participant to a room adjacent to the first one 
and informed them that they had to look for a pen-drive, which was attached on a coat hook. Once 
found, the participant had to take it and switch it with another pen-drive, which was hidden inside a 
book at the bottom of the wardrobe located in the room. The instruction also told the participant to 
leave the newspaper with the instruction near that book and to keep the first pen-drive with them for 
the rest of the experiment. The participant then came back to the first room waited for the 
interviewer.  Of the twenty videos, ten  were used for the comparable truth condition. Here, for the 




baseline questioning, the participants reported everything that happened before the meeting with the 
confederate. For the target questioning, the participant reported everything that happened after the 
meeting with the confederate. The remaining ten videos were used for the small talk condition. 
Here, the baseline questioning consisted of participants providing personal information (e.g.: 
describe their last year as a worker), whereas the target questioning was identical to that for 
participants in the comparable truth condition. That is, also participants in the small talk condition 
had to report everything that happened after the meeting with the confederate for the target 
questioning. All senders were honest in the baseline phase, whereas half of them were instructed to 
tell the truth and the other half to lie when responding to the target questioning. 
 Each video sequence was produced as follows: a black screen with a white text indicating 
“Baseline” appeared and lasted for three seconds. Then, the first sender appeared on the screen and 
started answering to the baseline question. Once s/he finished, a second black screen with the text 
“Target” appeared, also lasting three seconds. Then the first sender started answering the target 
question. Once s/he finished answering, another black screen appeared, and lasted for 30 seconds. 
In this time-window, participants had to make their veracity decisions. When the 30 seconds 
expired, a high frequency sound warned the participant that the time to evaluate the first sender was 
over and that the second sender was going to appear on the screen. This sequence was repeated until 
the end of the 10 videos. Participants expressed their veracity decisions answering the following 
question: “Do you believe the interviewee was…” . The answer alternatives were “Telling the truth” 
and “Lying”. Senders’ veracity status was counterbalanced and each ten targets tape consisted of 
five truth tellers and five liars. 
Procedure 
 Upon the arrival, participants met the experimenter and were briefed about the aim of the 
study. They were informed that they were going to watch some interviews that were divided into 
two sections: A baseline section and a target section. Observers where informed that the senders 
were always honest in the baseline section whereas they may have been either telling the truth or 




lying in the target section. Observers were asked to decide whether each sender was telling the truth 
or lying in the target section. They were told that they needed to pay attention to (non)verbal 
deviations from the baseline to make their decision. No training was offered. Assignment to the two 
baseline conditions was random. The participants were also informed that there were more answer 
sheets (twenty) than the actual amount of stimuli and also that truth and lie telling may be balanced 
in different amounts. Such instructions were given to prevent participants making decisions based 
on balancing expectations rather than lie detection task decisions. The participant also read and 
signed a consent form and were offered an additional point for a university exam if they performed 
well. Eventually, all participants received the point, regardless. Once they confirmed they 
understood the instructions, they were left alone in a room with a computer and the answer sheets. 
They were also instructed to exit the room once they completed their task. They then started 
watching the stimuli. Each participant was shown the tapes individually. 
Results 
 A t-test with type of Baseline as factor and overall accuracy rates as the dependent variable 
revealed that participants in the comparable truth condition were more accurate [M = 56.49; SD = 
18.74, 95% CI (50.24, 62.73)] than those in the small talk condition [M = 47.41; SD = 18.62, 95% 
CI (41.11, 53.71)], t(71) = 2.076, p = .042, Cohen’s d = .49, supporting Hypothesis 1. One t-test, 
again with type of Baseline as factor, showed no difference between conditions for truth accuracy, 
t(71) = 1.200, p = .22, Cohen’s d = .28 but showed a difference for lie accuracy, t(71) = 1.990, p = 
.050, Cohen’s d = .47, with the Comparable Truth baseline condition resulting in a higher lie 
accuracy rate than the Small Talk baseline condition (Table 1). Therefore, Hypothesis 2a was not 
supported but Hypothesis 2b received support.  
Enter Table 1 about here 
 Further analyses (see Table 2) showed that in the comparable truth baseline condition the 
total accuracy rate was significantly above chance. No other accuracy rate differed from chance and 
only lie accuracy rate differed from the accuracy rates found in Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-




analysis. In the small talk baseline condition, none of the accuracy rates differed from chance and 
the total and truth accuracy rates were significantly lower than those found in Bond and DePaulo’s 
(2006) meta-analysis.  
Enter Table 2 about here 
Signal Detection Analyses 
 It has been suggested to use Signal Detection Theory to analyse the accuracy of deception 
judgments in more detail (Jupe, Akehurst, Vernham, & Allen, 2016; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). 
Therefore, participants’ performance was assessed via discrimination accuracy, using d-prime 
values, and responding bias, using β values. The former is a measure of sensitivity expressed in 
standard deviations units (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Values of 0 indicate an inability to 
distinguish between the signal and noise, in our case liars from truth tellers. Values greater than 0 
indicate that the observers are indeed able to distinguish truthful from lying senders. 
 The β value is a measure of response bias (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) whereby values of 1 
indicate no response bias. On the other hand, values greater than 1 indicate a truth bias and values 
below 1indicate a lie bias. 
 A first t-test with baseline condition as factor and d-prime values as the dependent variable 
showed that observers in the comparable truth baseline [M = .35; SD = 1.00, 95% CI (.02, .68)] 
were better than those in the small talk baseline [M = -.13; SD = .99, 95% CI (-.47, .20)] at 
discriminating truth tellers from liars, t(71) = 2.079, p = .040, Cohen’s d = .49. This, again, supports 
Hypothesis 1. 
A between-subjects t-test on β values showed that participants in the comparable truth 
condition [M = 1.27; SD = .44, 95% CI (1.12, 1.42)] did not differ from those in the small talk 
condition [M = 1.21; SD = .48, 95% CI (1.04, 1.37)] in their response bias, t(71) = .59, p = .55, 
Cohen’s d = .14. Additionally, β values for participants in both baseline conditions were 
significantly greater than 1, indicating that all participants were truth biased, regardless of the type 
of Baseline exposure (Table 3). 




Enter Table 3 about here 
Discussion 
 In this experiment, we found that observers in the comparable truth condition were more 
accurate in distinguishing truth tellers from liars than observers in the small talk condition. In 
addition, observers in the comparable truth condition performed significantly better than chance 
levels whereas observers in the small talk condition did not. This shows the benefit of using a 
comparable truth baseline compared to a small talk baseline. Our results discourage the use of a 
small talk baseline technique, the technique used by practitioners (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 
2013) and advocated by some academics (Frank et al., 2006). 
 It should be noted that, although better than the small talk baseline, the comparable truth 
baseline is still not ready to be implemented in real life. It needs to be improved and should focus 
on verbal content only (Vrij, 2016). Verbal content is more diagnostic than nonverbal behaviour 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006) and it may be easier to establish verbal than nonverbal baselines as Palena 
et al’s (2018) study suggests. Future efforts can improve the comparable truth baseline technique 
integrating it with the techniques used for strategic questioning. For example, the interviewer can 
start the interview with the baseline approach and then employ strategic questioning using the 
already available within-subjects comparisons techniques reported in Vrij (2016), such as the 
reverse order technique (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2016; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012) and 
the verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014; Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 2016). In the 
reverse order technique, the interviewee is first asked to report the story in chronological order. 
Then, s/he is asked to report the same story from the end to the beginning, which typically results in 
truth tellers to report more reminiscences but fewer contradictions than liars (Vrij, 2016). According 
to the verifiability approach liars try not to report details which can be verified by an investigator. 
Consequently, the proportion of verifiable details (verifiable detail/(verifiable and unverifiable 
details combined) is higher for truth tellers than for liars (Nahari et al., 2014; Vrij, 2016).  




 Another possibility is to create a (semi)structured interview protocol which incorporates a 
baseline technique. A good example is the Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (ACID, 
Colwell et al., 2007). This protocol starts with a baseline question coupled with rapport building 
and is based on the concept of Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE), whereby it is thought that 
the use of mnemonics techniques and forced choice questions will result in truth tellers reporting 
more new details than liars. Colwell et al. (2007, 2013) used a small talk baseline (the last meal 
someone had or the first day of a semester). Future studies may explore how the ACID technique 
performs when a comparable truth baseline is used.  
 Future studies can also account for some of the limitations present in this study. First, the 
target event represented here is of low stakes. Increase in stakes makes a small talk baseline even 
less effective, as emotions experienced by the interviewee during the target response such as fear 
(of being caught, for the liar and of not being believed, for the truth teller), may result in more 
pronounced differences between the two phases of the interview, regardless of sender’s veracity 
(Ewens et al., 2014; Palena et al., 2018). Second, our participants did not receive any form of 
training in truth/lie detection. Therefore, their accuracy may benefit from training, as they would 
focus on more effective cues to truth/deception. For example, a recent meta-analysis (Hauch, 
Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2016) explored to what degree different types of training (e.g.: in 
verbal content, nonverbal behaviour, paralinguistic cues, etc.) affected credibility assessments. 
Their results showed that training did improve credibility assessments, particularly training focusing 
on speech content.  Third, our sample consisted of university students. It may be worthwhile to 
explore how professionals (e.g. police officers) perform when they are exposed to a comparable 
truth baseline.  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviation and Confidence Intervals for Truth and Lie Accuracy 
according to the Baseline Condition 
 Comparable Truth Small Talk 
 M SD CI M SD CI 
Truth 
accuracy 
57.84 30.10 47.80, 67.88 49.44 29.66 39.41, 59.48 
Lie accuracy 55.14 20.22 48.49, 61.88 45.42 21.49 38.14, 52.69 
 
  




Table 2. One Sample t-tests Comparing Observers' Accuracy Rates with a Meta Analysis 
Average Scores1 and with Chance in each Baseline Condition. 
Comparable Truth Baseline 
 Test value: meta-analyses average scores Test value: chance (50%) 
Accuracy t p d t p d 
Total .80 .42 .13 2.105 .04 .34 
Truth .64 .52 -.10 1.584 .12 .25 
Lie 2.447 .02 .39 1.544 .13 .25 
Small Talk Baseline 
 Test value: meta-analyses average scores Test value: chance (50%) 
Accuracy t p d t p d 
Total -2.124 .04 -.34 -.83 .40 -.13 
Truth -2.338 .02 -.38 -.11 .91 -.01 
Lie -.44 .66 -.07 -1.279 .20 -.21 
1Bond & DePaulo (2006). Total accuracy, 54%. Truth accuracy, 61%. Lie accuracy, 47%. 
 
  




Table 3. One Sample t-tests Exploring Observers' Sensitivity and Response Bias in each 
Baseline Condition 
 Comparable Truth Small Talk 
 t p d t p d 
d’ 2.129 .04 .34 -.817 .42 -.13 
β 3.737 .001 .60 2.629 .01 .43 
 
